Court Redefines Knowledge Requirement for Induced Infringement

 In a recent decision, authored by Justice Alito and joined by all the other Justices but Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court redefined the knowledge requirement for finding induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  The case—which centered on a patent for an innovative fryer—provided an opportunity for the Court to elucidate what is required for active inducement of infringement:  that the party accused of inducing infringement must have knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.  The Court then further held that this knowledge requirement could be satisfied by willful blindness, a concept borrowed primarily from criminal law.
 The Court began its analysis of induced infringement with a brief examination of the statute, finding the text “short, simple, and with respect to the question presented in this case, inconclusive.”  The Court did, however, note that the language of § 271(b) included an implied element of intent.  The Court then defined precisely what that intent element necessitates, relying on the 1964 decision in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II) to support the determination that knowledge under § 271(b) specifically requires knowledge of the patent.  The Court reasoned that knowledge for contributory infringement under § 271(c), which was specifically addressed in Aro II, was necessarily the same as knowledge for inducement.  Aro II established “that a violator of § 271(c) must know ‘that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented and infringed.’”  The Court adopted this knowledge standard to § 271(b), concluding that “induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” 
In so deciding, the Court definitively rejected deliberate indifference as the standard for knowledge—the standard the Federal Circuit had relied on in affirming the District Court’s finding of inducement.  The Court nevertheless affirmed the Federal Circuit, however, because it concluded that the knowledge requirement could be satisfied by a showing of willful blindness. Stating that such a proposition was supported both by traditional concepts of culpability and by the precedent, the Court held that “defendants cannot escape the reach of [] statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical fact that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.”  The Court acknowledged that willful blindness is principally a criminal law concept, having been endorsed in that context as early as the Court’s decision in 1899 in Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728.  Yet the Court concluded that “[g]iven the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).” 
Ultimately, the Court provided a two-part test for willful blindness for inducement.  First, a defendant must subjectively believe there is a high probability that a patent exists and would be infringed, and second must take deliberate actions to avoid knowing that fact.  In this case, the facts supported such a finding.  Specifically, the defendant was aware when it copied the plaintiff’s product that the product was an innovation in the U.S. market; defendant decided to copy an overseas model of the product, which it knew would not bear U.S. Patent markings; and the defendant decided not to inform an attorney it hired to give a right-to-use opinion that it copied the plaintiff’s product.  Taken together, the Court concluded the defendants actions were tantamount to “manufacture [of] a claim of plausible deniability in the event that [defendant] was later accused of patent infringement.” 
The Court’s decision provides a definitive—albeit somewhat heightened—standard for proving induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  It remains to be seen how this subjective standard will be applied going forward. 
For the complete opinion, click here.
 

Supreme Court Clarifies Ownership Rights in Federally Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act

In a 7-2 decision released yesterday, the Supreme Court ruled the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 (“the Bayh-Dole Act”) does not displace the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, and does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in the contractors receiving the federal funds.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, wrote that the Act does not “reorder[] the normal priority of rights in an invention” through language allowing contractors to retain title to “invention[s] of the contractor.”

The Majority based its opinion on the general rule of patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, a rule confirmed by the Court’s precedent.  Although the Court recognized that this general rule can be superseded by congressional act—and in fact has previously been superseded by legislation relating to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Energy, and NASA, for example—it noted that the Bayh-Dole Act contains no language specifically vesting ownership of federally funded inventions with the federal government, or with anyone else, including the contractor.  Further, the Court held that language in the Act permitting contractors to “elect to retain title” was not the equivalent of vesting title in those contractors.  Thus, the Act does not automatically vest rights in the invention in the contractor by virtue of the fact that the invention was funded (at least in part) by the federal government.

The Court effectively held that the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act affecting the rights of contractors in federally funded inventions apply only under circumstances where the contractor has already acquired those rights, i.e. upon effective assignment of the rights by the inventor to the contractor.  The dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Ginsberg, argue that such a position undermines the purpose of the Act, and runs contrary to the policies behind the Act, by “allow[ing] individual inventors, for whose invention the public has paid, to avoid the Act’s corresponding restrictions.”  The Majority addresses this concern by remarking that the issue of inventor’s individual rights is unlikely to become common because the assignments generally included in employment agreements will usually work to vest the rights to the invention in the contractor.

It is worth noting that under the facts of this case—where the inventor signed a separate agreement and assignment with another company after entering into an agreement with, and while still in the employ of, the contractor—the assignment to the contractor turned out to be ineffective.  This suggests that there may be other particular circumstances where the contractor may not obtain right in the invention despite the existence of an assignment by the inventor.

This case serves as an important reminder for employers, and especially contractors receiving federal research funds, to make sure that they require proper and effective assignments are executed.  The Court reaffirmed that mere employment is insufficient to vest title in an employee’s invention in the employer, and further held that the Bayh-Dole Act does not guarantee otherwise.

For the full opinion, click here.

Bayh-Dole Patent Ownership Dispute to be heard by Supreme Court

Last week, the Supreme Court announced it will review the Federal Circuit decision in Stanford v. Roche, addressing patent ownership under the Bayh-Dole Act, after granting Stanford's petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court will decide an interesting patent ownership dispute involving the contractual obligation of a University inventor to assign rights to the University and the same inventor's prior assignment of future rights to a company (which eventually became Roche).  The Federal Circuit ruled against Stanford, finding that the prior assignment of the inventor trumped the assignment obligation he later had with the University.

Whether a federal contractor university's statutory right under the Bayh-Dole Act35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212, in inventions arising from federally funded research can be terminated unilaterally by an individual inventor through a separate agreement purporting to assign the inventor's rights to a third party.
More on Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., after the jump. 
 

Supreme Court hears arguments today regarding first sale doctrine and international purchases

This morning the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., a case regarding the potential international scope of the first sale doctrine.  Costco lawfully purchased authentic Omega watches abroad and imported them to the United States for sale in its stores.  Omega sued for copyright infringement, arguing the watches bore a copyrighted design and the purchase abroad did not exhaust its rights under the first sale doctrine.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with Omega, holding the foreign purchase did not exhaust Omega's copyright rights in the United States (our post regarding the Ninth Circuit's decision is here).  Costco sought review by the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in April after inviting the United States to file a brief with its views on the matter.  The Solicitor General (at the time, Elena Kagan) filed a brief recommending the Court deny certiorari.  As a result of her involvement, Justice Kagan is recused from the case.

For our discussion of the Ninth Circuit decision being reviewed, click here.

For SCOTUS Blog's collection of documents relevant to the case, click here

Supreme Court to hear case regarding proper standard for proving inducing infringement under 271(b)

In an order today, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case regarding the necessary intent for inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  The case is Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., docket number 10-6.  The specific question presented is:

Whether the legal standard for the state of mind element of a claim for actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is "deliberate indifference of a known risk" that an infringement may occur, as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held, or "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" to encourage an infringement, as this Court taught in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster; Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937, 125 S. Ct. 2764,2780,162 L. Ed. 2d 781, 801 (2005)? 

The Supreme Court's full order list is here.  The original Federal Circuit opinion under review is here.

SCOTUSblog has the certiorari-stage documents collected here.  The case is set to be argued in the current term, but no schedule has yet been set for briefing on the merits or oral argument.

Supreme Court: Business method patents survive, but barely; Bilski's claims unpatentable

Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided Bilski v. Kappos, the most recent case at the Court probing the boundaries of patentable subject matter under § 101.  Details of the underlying facts of the Bilski case may be found in our post on the Federal Circuit's en banc decision here.

All nine Justices agreed that Bilski's method claims were not patentable.  All nine Justices also agreed the "machine-or-transformation" test, held by the Federal Circuit to be the exclusive test for whether method claims are patentable subject matter, was a useful test, but not the exclusive test for such claims.  In this way, the outcome was similar to KSR.  There, the Federal Circuit had adopted an exclusive test for the question of obviousness.  The Supreme Court then held the test was useful, but not the exclusive test for obviousness.  In addition, all members of the Court at least expressed skepticism that the "useful, concrete, tangible result" test from State Street was a viable test, with the majority stating "nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past," citing State Street, and the Justice Stevens opinion concurring in the judgment stating it would be a "grave mistake" to assume that all claims meeting this test are patentable. 

The disagreement among the Justices came when considering the question of whether business methods as a more general category fall within the scope of patentable subject matter defined in § 101.  More detail of that disagreement after the jump.

Update: The Court, in its last orders of the Term, has issued a GVR in two § 101 cases, the Prometheus case, relating to methods for measuring the level of certain drug metabolites in the system for the purpose of adjusting the drug administration level, and the Classen case, a nonprecedential opinion relating to a method of selecting a vaccination schedule by comparing alternatives and selecting the alternative with the lower likelihood of autoimmune disorders.  The Federal Circuit will therefore have two opportunities to address § 101 in light of the Court's guidance sooner rather than later.

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Bilski decided

This morning, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Bilski v. Kappos.  The court affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision.

We'll have more detailed analysis soon.

To read the opinion, click here.

Supreme Court: NFL collective licensing of trademarks not immune from Section 1 antitrust scrutiny

Monday the Supreme Court unanimously held the NFL's practice of collectively licensing the trademarks of all 32 individual teams is not immune from antitrust scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The NFL argued that because the marks are all licensed through a single entity, NFL Properties, there was no "contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy" under § 1, and therefore there could be no antitrust problem.

The Court disagreed.  The Court first observed the question of whether there is a "single enterprise" is not dependent on the specific legal structure of the entities.  As stated by the Court (internal citations omitted):

The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" amongst "separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests," such that the agreement "deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking," and therefore of "diversity of entrepreneurial interests," and thus of actual or potential competition.

Applying this framework, the Court held the existence of NFL Properties was not sufficient to prevent a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" and therefore avoid § 1 scrutiny.  The teams are "sparately controlled, potential competitors with economic interests that are distinct from NFLP's financial well-being." 

Despite holding the NFL's actions were subject to review under § 1, the Court did not pass on the merits, and noted some aspects of the NFL may provide a sufficient justification of its licensing practices under the Rule of Reason.  Ultimately, it will be up to the district court to address the merits of the case and determine whether there is a § 1 violation.

Click below for more detail of American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League and links to media coverage of the case.

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Supreme Court: Registration requirement of 411(a) not jurisdictional for copyright claims

Today the Supreme Court decided Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, a case regarding whether the registration requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) is jurisdictional or a claim processing rule. The Court held the requirement to be nonjurisdictional.

The case involves a class action for copyright infringement by freelance journalists based on republication of works in electronic databases that originally appeared in, for example, newspapers.  Some members of the class had copyright registrations, some did not.  Nevertheless, the district court certified the class and approved the proposed settlement agreement.  The Second Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of jurisdiction, and eventually held the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order regarding the unregistered copyrights by virtue of § 411(a).

The Supreme Court disagreed, and held the registration requirement of § 411(a) did not prevent a court from entering an order affecting unregistered copyrights.  Specifically, the Court held there was nothing in the statute that indicated Congress intended the requirement to be jurisdictional.  Notably, the Court observed § 411(a) did not "clearly state[]" that its requirement was jurisdictional, and also explicitly permits claims involving unregistered works in certain circumstances.  This was inconsistent with a jurisdictional requirement, and therefore the district court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement agreement even though it adjudicated claims for unregistered copyrights.

The Court left the question as to whether district courts should sua sponte dismiss copyright cases where the Plaintiff is asserting an unregistered copyright for another day.

More detail of Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick after the jump.

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Highlights from oral arguments in Bilski v. Kappos

On Monday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bilski v. Kappos in an effort to determine the proper test to be applied to determine whether a claim is patentable subject matter under § 101.  The oral argument transcript is available from the Court's website here.

Click below for our thoughts on the arguments and some of the more interesting quotes from the Justices' questioning.

 

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