In Forest Group v. Bon Tool Co., the Federal Circuit held that the false marking statute applies on a per article basis, rather than on a per decision to mark basis.  The Federal Circuit reversed the district court, which had imposed a fine of $500 for a single decision to falsely mark a shipment of stilts as patented when they were not patented, and instructed the district court to recalculate the fine based on the total number of stilts that were falsely marked.

More details of Forest Group v. Bon Tool Co. after the jump.

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In an order yesterday, the Federal Circuit has agreed to consider the scope of evidence to be considered in an action filed under 35 U.S.C. § 145 to obtain review of a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.  The case is Hyatt v. Kappos.  Specifically, the court ordered briefing on the following issues:

(a) Are there any limitations on the admissibility of evidence in section 145 proceedings? In particular—

(i) Does the Administrative Procedure Act require review on the agency record in proceedings pursuant to section 145?

(ii) Does section 145 provide for a de novo proceeding in the district court?

(iii) If section 145 does not provide for a de novo proceeding in the district court, what limitations exist on the presentation of new evidence before the district court?

(b) Did the district court properly exclude the Hyatt declaration?

In the original panel decision, the court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that "should have been" raised before the Board but was not, specifically evidence relating to enablement.  Judge Moore dissented, contending Hyatt was entitled to introduce new evidence in a § 145 proceeding. 

No oral argument date has yet been set.  To read the full order granting en banc review, click here.

The Federal Circuit has clarified the relevant timeframe for purposes of determining whether two claimed inventions are patentably distinct or would result in impermissible double patenting.  The court held "the relevant time frame for determining whether a product and process are 'patentably distinct' should be at the filing date of the secondary application."

Here, the product application was filed over a decade before the process application.  The district court originally granted summary judgment of no double patenting based on evidence of developments that came after both applications were filed.  It was unclear whether any of the alternative methods were available before the second application was filed, so the court remanded the case for resolution of that issue.

More detail of Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Doll after the jump.

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After the Fifth Circuit's Volkswagen and the Federal Circuit's TS Tech decisions, potential patent plaintiffs should be getting the message:  Don't file in the Eastern District of Texas unless there are actually some sources of proof there.  The Federal Circuit has again granted mandamus ordering the district court to transfer another case out of the district.

In this case, there were no witnesses within the court's subpoena power.  The allegedly infringing product was designed, manufactured, and tested elsewhere.  The plaintiff had no offices in the district.  While 75,000 pages of relevant documents were in the district, they were electronically transferred to the plaintiff's counsel there, apparently for purposes of providing an "anchor" to the district.  The district court held the case was "decentralized," and transfer would only adjust which witnesses would be inconvenienced. 

The Federal Circuit was having none of it, however.  The court observed that the Eastern District of North Carolina had subpoena power over four (of eighteen) non-party witnesses and was also the site of all documentation regarding the development of the accused product.  The court was particularly unimpressed with the presence of the 75,000 pages of documents, stating the notion that these documents were "Texas" documents was "a fiction which appears to have been created to manipulate the propriety of venue."  Because of the utter lack of connection to Texas, the court ordered the district court to transfer the case to North Carolina.

More detail of In re Hoffman-La Roche Inc. after the jump.

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According to the Federal Circuit, the answer to this question appears to be "yes."  The court reversed a district court's dismissal of a declaratory judgment action against a patent holding company (or non-practicing entity (NPE), sometimes pejoratively referred to as a patent troll).  The DJ action was predicated on three letters, the first from the NPE to the DJ plaintiff, the second in reply, and the third from the NPE in reply to the second.  The court held there was a sufficient "implied assertion of its rights" under the patent to support DJ jurisdiction.

Of particular note are some statements the court made regarding different rules when NPEs contact potential licensees for their patents.  These include:

[T]he receipt of such correspondence from a non-competitor patent holding company . . . may invoke a different reaction than would a meet-and-discuss inquiry by a competitor, presumably with intellectual property of its own to place on the bargaining table. Under the totality of the circumstances, therefore, it was not unreasonable for [the DJ plaintiff] to interpret [the NPE's] letters as implicitly asserting its rights under the patent.

. . .

[The NPE] is solely a licensing entity, and without enforcement it receives no benefits from its patents. This adds significance to the fact that [the NPE] refused [the DJ plaintiff's] request for a mutual standstill . . . .

Even the court observed it was changing the rules, noting "our decision in this case undoubtedly marks a shift from past declaratory judgment cases."  Based on this decision, it appears very difficult for a NPE to even contact a potential licensee without exposing itself to the potential for a declaratory judgment action.

More detail of Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC after the jump.

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If anyone needed further proof that patents are more easily held obvious after KSR, look no further.  The Federal Circuit held that a patent directed to a method of email marketing with improved efficiency was obvious based on the "common sense" of one in the art. 

The claimed method had four steps, the fourth of which was (as described by the court) repeating the first three steps until a minimum threshold of emails were successfully received.  It was undisputed that the first three steps were known in the art and that the final step was not in the prior art. The district court held the addition of the final step "would be obvious to virtually anyone."

The Federal Circuit agreed.  After citing the relevant passages from KSR regarding common sense, the court observed:

[W]hile an analysis of obviousness always depends on evidence that supports the required Graham factual findings, it also may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion.

The court did reiterate that the analysis underlying the application of common sense "must be made explicit" in order to facilitate review, but held the district court had done so here.  The court observed that if the relevant technology were complex, expert opinions may be required.  However, in this case the level of ordinary skill in the art was a high school education and limited experience.  Of course, the court also held that even if the expert witness testimony was considered, it also confirmed the conclusion of obviousness.  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.

More detail of Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc. after the jump.

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The Federal Circuit has agreed to hear en banc an interesting issue with regard to the potential for patent misuse in licensing.  The case is Princo Corp. v. ITC.  At issue is the patent pool related to the technology used for CD-R and CD-RW discs.  The alleged infringer, Princo, admitted infringement before the ITC, but asserted the patents unenforceable due to patent misuse.  The ITC originally rejected this defense, but a divided panel of the Federal Circuit held additional factual determinations were necessary to assess the defense.  

Currently-available CD-R and CD-RW discs use analog technology to assist the recording device in determining where on the disc the recording laser is located at any given time.  Another potential alternative (that has not been implemented in the marketplace) is using digital technology to make this determination.  According to the defendant, the digital alternative was never commercialized because of an agreement between Sony and Philips (two of the owners of patents in the relevant patent pool) not to license a Sony patent covering this digital alternative for this purpose.  According to the defendant, this amounted to a type of horizontal price fixing, and was therefore patent misuse.  The ITC disagreed, and held no misuse occurred.

A divided panel of the Federal Circuit disagreed, and remanded the case to the ITC for further factual development.  The court stated the precompetitive benefits sometimes seen in the context of patent pools are completely absent in the context of an agreement not to license patents covering a potentially competing technology.  The panel majority held this was at least potentially an antitrust violation under the rule of reason.

The en banc Federal Circuit has now agreed to address this issue, with the briefing cycle to be completed shortly after the new year.  Oral argument is not yet set (update, see below), but the case has the potential to provide some clarity on when an arguably anticompetitive licensing practice crosses over into patent misuse.

Click here for the order granting rehearing en banc.

Update (10/29):  The Federal Circuit has set oral argument in the case for March 3 at 2:00 PM.

Click below for a full summary of the panel decision in Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n.

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In a case of first impression for the Federal Circuit, the court addressed the issue of how to apply Federal Rule 4(k)(2) (the Federal Court's long-arm statute) to a defendant.  The court, in agreement with several other circuits, that a Rule 4(k)(2) analysis is appropriate when (1) the plaintiff's claim arises under federal law, (2) the defendant is not amenable to jurisdiction in any individual state, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.

Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The court held the fact that representatives of the defendant showed the accused products at a trade show in California was sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction.  The court held attendance at the trade show was sufficient for the defendant to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the United States, and that the infringement claim arose out of these contacts, even though the defendant's representatives took steps to ensure it was clear the allegedly infringing devices were not for sale in the United States.

The court left the most interesting questions for future cases, including whether bringing the allegedly infringing devices to the trade show constitutes an infringing act of importation under § 271, whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the burden to show the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of any state under the second step of the Rule 4(k)(2) analysis (and what sufficies as such a showing), and whether a district court must undertake a Rule 4(k)(1) analysis before a 4(k)(2) analysis.

More detail of Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico after the jump.

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In a recent decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part a district court's decision regarding obviousness, holding the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment that the asserted claims were invalid for obviousness.  The court vacated the district court's entry of judgment of an inconsistent jury verdict of obviousness:  the jury held a dependent claim obvious but the independent claim from which it depends not obvious.  The court stated that such a result reflects an "irreconcilable inconsistency" and thus a new trial on obviousness must be granted.

The court also addressed the question of incorporation by reference.  The defendant argued the claims were anticipated based on a prior art patent that made reference to another patent for one of the relevant limitations.  The district court held the incorporation by reference was ineffective and excluded expert testimony regarding the "combined" prior art.  The Federal Circuit reversed, holding the incorporation by reference was sufficiently specific to be successful, and remanded the issue of anticipation to the district court for redetermination.

More on Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co. after the jump.

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In a Federal Register notice today, the USPTO has officially withdrawn the claim and continuation rule changes from the Code of Federal Regulations.  This is consistent with a press release from Thursday announcing the rules were no longer going to be pursued.  The summary of the notice:

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (Office) published a final rule in the Federal Register in August of 2007 to revise the rules of practice for patent cases pertaining to continuing applications and requests for continued examination practices, and for the examination of claims in patent applications (Claims and Continuations Final Rule). The Office is revising the rules of practice in this final rule to remove the changes in the Claims and Continuations Final Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations.

The USPTO and GlaxoSmithKline (one of the plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief against implementation of the rules) have joined in a motion to dismiss the appeal and vacate the district court decision.  Tafas, the other plaintiff, has not joined the motion regarding the vacatur of the district court decision, wanting it to stay on the books as a limit on future rulemaking attempts by the USPTO.

To read the press release, click here.

To read the full Federal Register notice with background history on the rules and the underlying litigation, click here.