False marking applies on a per article basis, not a per decision to mark basis

In Forest Group v. Bon Tool Co., the Federal Circuit held that the false marking statute applies on a per article basis, rather than on a per decision to mark basis.  The Federal Circuit reversed the district court, which had imposed a fine of $500 for a single decision to falsely mark a shipment of stilts as patented when they were not patented, and instructed the district court to recalculate the fine based on the total number of stilts that were falsely marked.

More details of Forest Group v. Bon Tool Co. after the jump.

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Supreme Court: Registration requirement of 411(a) not jurisdictional for copyright claims

Today the Supreme Court decided Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, a case regarding whether the registration requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) is jurisdictional or a claim processing rule. The Court held the requirement to be nonjurisdictional.

The case involves a class action for copyright infringement by freelance journalists based on republication of works in electronic databases that originally appeared in, for example, newspapers.  Some members of the class had copyright registrations, some did not.  Nevertheless, the district court certified the class and approved the proposed settlement agreement.  The Second Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of jurisdiction, and eventually held the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order regarding the unregistered copyrights by virtue of § 411(a).

The Supreme Court disagreed, and held the registration requirement of § 411(a) did not prevent a court from entering an order affecting unregistered copyrights.  Specifically, the Court held there was nothing in the statute that indicated Congress intended the requirement to be jurisdictional.  Notably, the Court observed § 411(a) did not "clearly state[]" that its requirement was jurisdictional, and also explicitly permits claims involving unregistered works in certain circumstances.  This was inconsistent with a jurisdictional requirement, and therefore the district court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement agreement even though it adjudicated claims for unregistered copyrights.

The Court left the question as to whether district courts should sua sponte dismiss copyright cases where the Plaintiff is asserting an unregistered copyright for another day.

More detail of Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick after the jump.

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Federal Circuit to consider en banc whether new evidence may be introduced in a section 145 action

In an order yesterday, the Federal Circuit has agreed to consider the scope of evidence to be considered in an action filed under 35 U.S.C. § 145 to obtain review of a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.  The case is Hyatt v. Kappos.  Specifically, the court ordered briefing on the following issues:

(a) Are there any limitations on the admissibility of evidence in section 145 proceedings? In particular—

(i) Does the Administrative Procedure Act require review on the agency record in proceedings pursuant to section 145?
(ii) Does section 145 provide for a de novo proceeding in the district court?
(iii) If section 145 does not provide for a de novo proceeding in the district court, what limitations exist on the presentation of new evidence before the district court?

(b) Did the district court properly exclude the Hyatt declaration?

In the original panel decision, the court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that "should have been" raised before the Board but was not, specifically evidence relating to enablement.  Judge Moore dissented, contending Hyatt was entitled to introduce new evidence in a § 145 proceeding. 

No oral argument date has yet been set.  To read the full order granting en banc review, click here.

Developments up to second-filed application relevant to show no double patenting

The Federal Circuit has clarified the relevant timeframe for purposes of determining whether two claimed inventions are patentably distinct or would result in impermissible double patenting.  The court held "the relevant time frame for determining whether a product and process are 'patentably distinct' should be at the filing date of the secondary application."

Here, the product application was filed over a decade before the process application.  The district court originally granted summary judgment of no double patenting based on evidence of developments that came after both applications were filed.  It was unclear whether any of the alternative methods were available before the second application was filed, so the court remanded the case for resolution of that issue.

More detail of Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Doll after the jump.

 

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